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Abstract
Auction mechanisms commonly used in practice for awarding infrastructure concession contracts
induce a bias towards the selection of concessionaires who are optimistic about demand, but are
not necessarily cost-efficient. This helps to explain the frequent renegotiation of concessions
observed in practice. This paper shows that the fixed-term nature of contracts is the key element
for selection errors, and it proposes a better alternative mechanism based on flexible-term
contracts. This new auction mechanism reduces the probability of selection errors and contract
renegotiation, and it is simple enough to constitute a good option for concessions in sectors like
transport and public utilities.
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21. Introduction
The provision of basic infrastructure, like railways, bridges or seaports, has been traditionally a
responsibility assumed by governments. However, since the late 1980’s, there is a worldwide trend
towards a more active participation of private investors in the construction and financing of large
infrastructure projects. This is specially relevant for developing countries1, but it is increasingly
observed also in developed economies.
A popular model for the participation of private capital in infrastructure is the concession contract.
This is an agreement between a government and a private firm –generally a consortium formed of
several parties– for the construction or major rehabilitation of some infrastructure. Private investors
assume all costs related to the project, and in return they obtain the right to operate the assets (power
plants, airports, roads, and so forth) during some pre-specified period. Investment costs are thus
recovered from charges or tolls on infrastructure’s users. Governments retain ownership and control
over the assets and may regulate prices and quality.
The mechanism for selecting concessionaires to implement infrastructure projects is usually a
sealed-envelope type of auction. In the area of governments’ contracts with private firms, the
literature on auctions has devoted a great deal of attention to the analysis of competitive bidding for
procurement contracts (Stark, 1971; Holt, 1980; Porter and Zona, 1993; Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer, 2000), and to study the problem of the winner’s curse (for a general discussion, see
Milgrom, 1989; for an application to the road sector, see Thiel, 1988; Levin and Smith, 1990).
                                                                
1 A database on concessions for infrastructure projects signed during the 1990s in developing countries, compiled by
the World Bank, reports the existence of 700 contracts. By sector, 45% of these contracts are transport projects, 25%
water, 20% electricity, and 10% in telecommunications. By region, 60% are located in Latin America, 20% in Asia, and
20% in Eastern Europe.
3Less attention has received the particular context of concession contracts, although there are many
interesting questions about firms’ selection and ex-post contract renegotiation2. However, this is an
area where research on auctions is probably most valuable for governments, as stressed by
Klemperer (1999). Infrastructure projects have long economic lives –generally above 25 years– and
therefore are built under high uncertainty about costs and future levels of demand. Therefore, there
are two dimensions to be considered: asymmetric information between governments and firms
regarding costs; and different firms’ beliefs about the future demand for the infrastructure. In the
terminology of auction theory, governments are faced with a problem that combines elements both
from a ‘private-value’ model (regarding costs), and a ‘common-value’ type of situation (related to
the uncertainty of demand). Selection of the firm with lowest feasible cost, and minimisation of risks
introduced by demand fluctuations, should be the main targets that an auction mechanism should
pursue in this context. In particular, the risk of demand fluctuations is one of the main causes of
difficulties for infrastructure projects. There are many international experiences about concessions
entering into difficulties due to deviations between forecasted and actual levels of demand3. On the
other hand, a reduction of the risk of demand may contribute to decrease concessionaires’ costs,
through lower risk premia associated to the cost of capital.
The frequent observed renegotiation of concession contracts and the need to bail out concessionaires
indicate that selection mechanisms may be failing to achieve those objectives. Furthermore, there
is evidence that the type of auction used to select a concessionaire might have an impact on the
future performance of an infrastructure project. Using data from a large sample (see footnote 1),
                                                                
2 Riordan and Sappington (1987), is one of the few contributions to the analysis of the problem of concessionaires’
selection. Tirole (1986) presents a model of renegotiation between a government and a firm contracted for some
procurement task, though it does not explicitly deal with the preceding stage of contract tendering.
3 One of the more dramatic examples was a road program implemented in Mexico during the 1990s (52 concessions to
build around 6,000 km of new highways). Actual levels of demand were on average 68 percent below expectations, and
for 16 concessions traffic was below 50 percent of forecasted levels. In 1997, the Mexican government was forced to
recover 25 of these concessions, assuming debts for US$ 7.7 billion. Besides, losses for private investors were estimated
in US$ 3 billion (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996; Gómez-Ibáñez, 1997).
4Guasch (2000) reports that 65 percent of all concession contracts are renegotiated. Interestingly, the
probability of renegotiation is higher when the concessionaire is selected through an auction based
on offers for minimum price (92 per cent of contracts renegotiated), than when a maximum payment
is used as the bidding variable (29 per cent).
The objective of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms generally used in practice for
awarding infrastructure concession contracts are far from being optimal, and to propose a better
alternative mechanism. It is formally proved how traditional auctions based on bids for minimum
prices or maximum payments do not generally select the most cost-efficient candidate. On the
contrary, they introduce a bias towards the selection of concessionaires who are optimistic about
future demand levels, which is likely to be one of the main reasons behind the frequent renegotiation
of contracts. The fixed-term nature of traditional contracts is the basic element that induces selection
errors, so the alternative proposed is to use a mechanism based on flexible-term contracts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model used for the analysis of
auctions. Section 3 uses a basic scenario with private values regarding construction costs, and
presents the concept of flexible-term concession contracts. Section 4 introduces maintenance and
operation costs, assumed to be equal across firms, to evaluate the impact of these costs on outcomes.
Section 5 considers variability on construction and maintenance costs across firms, and discusses
in detail the proposed new auction mechanism for the award of flexible-term concession contracts.
Section 6 summarises the main results and concludes the paper.
52. A model to analyse auctions for infrastructure concessions
A simple framework is proposed to analyse auctions for the award of concession contracts. The
number of users Q who will demand services from a new infrastructure to be built4 is unknown at
the moment of drafting the contract. All users are equal, and each of them demands one unit of
service from the infrastructure. The only available information about demand is a range of feasible
values [Qmin , Qmax.]. In order to represent a situation of maximum uncertainty about future demand,
it is considered that Q  is uniformly distributed over that range.. Once that uncertainty about the state
of nature is resolved (the infrastructure is built and open to the public), demand is found to take a
particular value Q*. This level is considered to be constant over time, i.e. there will be Q* users each
year during the whole life of the concession.
There are N firms bidding for the contract, which are different in terms of cost efficiency. Two types
of costs are considered: construction costs (Ii , i = 1,.., N), which represent all investments required
before the infrastructure is operative; and maintenance and operation costs (Mi , i = 1,.., N), which
are annual fixed expenses in which the concessionaire incurs for the provision of services
(equipment and personnel) and to maintain the infrastructure (repairs, periodic revisions, and so
forth). Mi is assumed to be constant over time, and does not vary with the level of demand. The
reason is that only maintenance and operation costs of fixed nature are relevant for the analysis. All
other variable costs that depend on Q are formally  equivalent to a reduction in the price P paid by
each user.
As indicated by notation, it is assumed that there are different firms’ types regarding both
construction costs (Ii) and maintenance and operation costs (Mi). This assumption is justified by the
6fact that firms’ managers have some degree of control over firms’ costs, because they might have
different skills, or may exert more or less effort in reducing costs. In particular, it is assumed that
Ii is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [Imin, Imax], and Mi from another independent
uniform distribution over [Mmin, Mmax].
For fixed-term concession contracts, the total number of years during which the concessionaire
operates the infrastructure is predetermined by the government, and denoted as T. The
concessionaire knows that, once the level of demand Q* is revealed, it will receive a total revenue
equal to PQ*T during the life of the concession. The price P may be set by the government or, in the
case of an auction based on price offers, it will be the price bid for by the winner. It is considered
that, apart from investment and maintenance costs, the concessionaire must make a lump-sum
payment Z to the government. This payment is made at the beginning of the concession, and it could
take negative values (a subsidy is demanded to operate the concession), or zero (no payment is
required). In some cases, Z might be the bidding variable at the auction, while in others it is pre-
specified by the government.
The project is assumed to be built in year t=0, when the concessionaire makes all investments Ii, and
it starts receiving users in year t=1, when the firm initiates the collection of revenues through tolls
or tariffs, and incurring into maintenance and operation costs. Without loss of generality, the
discount rate is assumed to be equal to one, since considering a discount rate δ < 1 does not alter the
basic results of the paper. All firms are considered to be risk-neutral and to maximise expected
profits for the whole life of the concession. For a given belief on future demand Qe, expected profits
for firm i are equal to Πie = (P Qe - Mi) T - Ii - Z.
                                                                                                                                                            
4 Throughout the paper, all discussions focus on a case where the infrastructure to be built is new, but the same
arguments apply to a project to enhance or rehabilitate existing assets (road enlargements, second runways at airports,
improvement of power transmission lines, and so forth). Demand uncertainty, however, will be generally lower for
7Several alternatives exist for the design of auctions to tender concession contracts. The most
common are to invite offers for prices, awarding the contract to the lowest price; or offers for fee
payments to the government, where the highest proposed fee wins. These are the two mechanisms
analysed in this paper. Auctions for concessions are generally open only to those firms who pass a
preliminary filtering process. Other auctions less frequently observed in practice are based on bids
for investments, volumes of service, or duration of the contract. In some cases, several bidding
variables can be used simultaneously, with some weighted criterion to select the auction’s winner.
3. Scenario with no maintenance costs: fixed-term and flexible-term contracts
Using the proposed framework, it is possible to study the optimal strategies pursued by firms
competing for a concession contract at an auction, and the outcomes that are obtained. We will
consider initially a simple scenario with no maintenance costs (Mi = 0). The two most common types
of auctions to award contracts (minimum price or maximum payment) are examined and compared,
and then it is shown how an auction to award a flexible-term concession contract outperforms
traditional auctions.
3.1  Minimum price auction
Consider an auction at which candidates must present sealed-envelopes with their bids for the price
that they propose to charge users for the use of infrastructure (Pi). Envelopes are opened
simultaneously and the winner is the firm with the lowest price. No possible modification or
negotiation over the proposed price is permitted after the auction is resolved. The contract term T
is set by the government and known in advance by bidders.
                                                                                                                                                            
rehabilitation than for greenfield projects.
8Assume that all candidates share a common belief Qe about the expected level of demand (this
assumption will be later relaxed). This could be the case for example if the government provides
results from demand studies in preparation for the auction, and participants do not invest to have
other alternative estimates.
Consider the best strategy to be pursued by a firm with construction cost Ii. In general, bids will be
based on firms’ types (i.e. on their relative cost efficiency), so it is assumed that the price offered
is a function of Ii. We then search for symmetric equilibria, where all firms use the same rule to
calculate their bids. Thus, the price offered by firm i will be Pi = P(Ii), with P’ > 0. Using the known
probability distribution of construction costs, it is possible for any firm i to compute the probability
of winning the auction with a particular offer Pi. Comparing i’s bid with that of any other firm j, firm
i wins if  Pi < Pj, or, applying the inverse function P-1(·), if P-1(Pi) < P-1(Pj) = Ij. Therefore, by
choosing carefully its bid, firm i knows that it would win the contract against any firm j with the
same probability of the event [Ij > P-1(Pi)]. Since there are N-1 rivals at the auction, the probability
for firm i to win the contract with a bid Pi is equal to:
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 )()( −−−−− −−=>= NimaxNminmaxNiji PPIIIPPIprobprob (1)
All firms are risk neutral, so each of them will calculate its optimal bid by maximising expected
profits, given the probability of being selected as concessionaire as indicated by (1). When all firms
share a common belief Qe about the future level of demand, the problem that firm i solves to
compute its optimal bid Pi can be expressed as:
( )( ) NrNimaxieieiP IPPIZITQPMax i −−−−−−=Π 111 )( (2)
where Ir = Imax - Imin is a constant that can be ignored. The first order condition of problem (2) is a
differential equation in terms of the optimal function P(·):
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Due to the uniform distribution assumed for construction costs Ii, the solution to equation (3) turns
out to be a linear function in terms of Ii and other parameters:
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These optimal bids Pi exhibit some interesting properties. First, when all firms share the same
expected demand Qe, it is clear that the mechanism selects the most efficient firm, because the
candidate with the lowest construction cost wins the contract. Second, the price offered allows the
concessionaire to obtain some positive profits, given by the second term of the right-hand side of
expression (4). Whether firm i to offer a price Pi = (Ii + Z)/ Qe T, its expected profit would be zero,
therefore the term (Imax-Ii)/N indicates the information rent that the winner extracts. This rent
decreases with the number N of firms participating at the auction, it is zero for the least efficient firm
with Ii = Imax, and it reaches a maximum for the most efficient firm.
3.2  Maximum payment auction
A second traditional model to award concession contracts is an auction at which firms make offers
for a payment Z to the government, and the contract is won by the highest bid. These payments Z
could even be negative, in which case candidates demand subsidies for the construction of the
project, and the contract is awarded to the firm demanding the lowest subsidy (highest Z in that
context). In this type of auction, the price P is set by the government, as well as the duration T of
the contract.
As in the previous case, each firm will calculate its bid Zi as a function of its type Ii, and again we
search for a symmetric equilibrium in which all candidates use the same function Z(·), with Z’(·) <0,
10
to compute their bids Zi. The probability of firm i winning the auction is now the probability of the
event Zi > Zj, for any j other than i. In terms of construction costs, this can be expressed as:
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( ) NrNimaxNjiNjii IZZIIZZprobZZprobprob −−−−−− −=<=>= 111111 )()( (5)
Optimal strategies are then derived from the maximisation of expected profits:
( )( ) NrNimaxiieeiZ IZZIZITQPMax i −−−−−−=Π 111 )( (6)
The first order condition of problem (6) is a differential equation similar to (3), which yields:
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Optimal strategies on payments Zi share the same properties of Pi. Namely, if firms had the same
beliefs about future demand, the mechanism would select the most efficient firm in terms of
construction costs. The concessionaire is able to extract some informational rent, because the
proposed payment to the goverment yields a positive expected profit equal to (Imax-Ii)/N. It is worth
noticing that this rent is exactly the same that the winner of the price auction obtains, which is a
revenue-equivalence result in the context of this model.5
This result has some practical lessons. It tells a government that the form used to auction a
concession contract is irrelevant from the point of view of the firm, which can expect the same level
of profits. However, the economic impact of each particular type of auction is different. When a
price auction is used, users of infrastructure pay for the rent that the concessionaire obtains, through
prices somewhat higher than the feasible minimum. Meanwhile, when using a payment auction, the
                                                                
5 A well known result from auction theory is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Vickrey, 1961; Myerson, 1981; Riley
and Samuelson, 1981), which states that, if bidders are risk-neutral, the form used by a seller to auction a good (first-
and second-price sealed bids, English and Dutch auctions) yields the same expected revenues. In our model, all auctions
are first-price sealed bids, but results indicate that, in terms of expected revenues, it does not matter which bidding
variable is used.
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rent (Imax-Ii)/N takes the form of a lower than optimal fee for the government, so taxpayers are in fact
paying for that rent. Another lesson is the importance of having as many firms as possible competing
for a concession contract. The number N of bidders reduces the information rent that a
concesssionaire may extract. In the limit, if N tends to be sufficiently large, this rent would be zero,
obtaining the known result of converge to real values (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979).
3.3  Problems suffered by traditional systems: selection errors and risk of renegotiation
As indicated when analysing optimal bidding rules given by (4) and (7), the traditional price and
payment auctions will select the most efficient candidate (lowest Ii in this context), but only when
all candidates share the same expected demand levels Qe. This assumption will hardly hold in
practice, given the difficulties associated with accurate demand forecasting. Therefore, it is more
realistic to consider that Qe will be a random variable drawn from some support [Qmin, Qmax], and
that each candidate may have a different belief Qie. To represent a situation of maximum demand
uncertainty, we will consider a uniform distribution Qie →U [Qmin, Qmax].
The impact of beliefs about demand on the bids submitted by candidates can be assessed by studying
expressions (4) and (7). It can be observed that dPi(Ii) / dQie < 0 and dZi(Ii) / dQie > 0, which means
that those candidates with high expected demand levels will tend to submit better bids (lower prices
and higher payments, respectively), than other candidates with similar costs but lower demand
expectations. This creates two types of problems. First, the mechanisms do not longer guarantee the
selection of the most efficient candidate, and the possibility of selection errors appears. Second, and
related to the former, the selection of overoptimistic concessionaires with costs higher than optimal
12
increases the risk that contract renegotiation6 might be required to bail out bankrupted
concessionaires, in situations of low demand.
(a) Selection error:  Consider an auction at which candidates are ranked according to their
construction costs, so that I1 < I2 <...< IN. A selection error occurs if the auction mechanism selects
a firm Ij other than I1. The condition required for that event is simply that firm j’s bid turns out to
be better than firm 1’s (a lower price or a higher payment, respectively, at each type of auction). This
can only occur when the belief of firm j about demand is sufficiently higher than firm 1’s, i.e.
Qje/Q1e = 1+λ, with λ > 0 representing the degree of relative ‘optimism’ of firm j.
Using expressions (4) and (7) for optimal bids, it is possible to determine the required size of λ for
a firm other than 1 to win each type of auction and thus to be selected as concessionaire :
Price auction:
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The basic factors that affect the possibility of making selection errors are reflected in expressions
(8) and (9). The cost gap between firms (Ij-I1) and λ are directly related, therefore a wider range of
feasible construction costs makes errors to be less likely (because, on average, the difference
between I1 and Ij will tend to be larger). A large number N of bidders reduces the probability of
selection errors for both types of auctions. It is noticeable that the contract term T does not have an
effect on the probability of error for the auction price, while it does on the payment auction,
increasing the possibility of selection errors for longer contracts.
                                                                
6 Throughout the paper, we assume that renegotiation is only ‘honestly’ sought by firms, i.e. there is no strategic bidding
anticipating the possibility of contract renegotiation. Firms compute their bids based on real costs and demand
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It is possible to compute explicit expressions for the probability of selection errors, based on the
assumed uniform distributions for demand beliefs Qie→U[Qmin,Qmax] and construction costs
Ii→U[Imin, Imax]. The demand belief of any firm j, relative to that of the most efficient firm in terms
of costs, is by definition a random variable (1+ λ) = Qje / Q1e, with probability distribution function:
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At an auction with N bidders, the expected values for costs Ii of each of them can be calculated for
any given value of the most efficient firm I1. Because the cost of the remaining N-1 bidders must
be uniformly distributed between I1 and Imax, any firm at position j in the ranking of costs will have
an expected construction cost equal to Ij = I1 + j (Imax-I1)/N. Thus, it is feasible to compute, for any
firm j, the required relative demand belief to overcome the gap Ij-I1, necessary for firm j to submit
an offer better than the one from the most efficient firm 1.
For the price auction, and disregarding situations in which a firm with cost {I3,...,IN} could outbid
the most efficient firm7, the probability of selection errors, prob (sP), is equal to:
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expectations. Therefore, renegotiation only takes place when demand turns out to be low and the concessionaire faces
a situation with Πi* < 0. For a model of renegotiation and strategic bidding, see Wang (2000).
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The probability of selection error for the payment auction, prob (sZ), can be similarly calculated. Its
expression is slightly more complex, because in this case the condition to be satisfied for firm 2 to
be selected instead of firm 1 varies with Q1e.
[ ]∫ ∫
−
′
′
−
−
−
=
−
max
min
max
min
I
I
Q
Q
e
minmax
e
min
e
max
N
max
N
max
Z dIdQQQQI
QQIQ
II
II
sprob 112
11
2
11
1
1
1
)(),(2
),(
)(
)(
)(
θ
θ
(12)
with  
TQPN
IINQI e
maxe
1
2
1
11
)()1(
1),( −−+=′θ .
(b) Contract renegotiation: The conditions for a concession contract to enter into financial problems
and require to be renegotiated are similar in nature to those of selection errors. The event Πi* < 0
occurs when the actual demand for the infrastructure Q* is low, and falls below expectations.
Revenues obtained from users might then result insufficient to cover for infrastructure costs, so the
concessionaire is forced to go bankrupt unless the government accepts to introduce changes in the
contract terms, like rising the price, providing subsidies or extending the life of the concession. As
described above, this is a practice too frequently observed for real concessions.
Consider the random variable µ = Q* / Q1e, representing the deviation of actual demand Q* with
respect to the forecasted value used by the winner when computing its bid. The condition for a
concession contract awarded through a price auction to be renegotiated is:
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7 Total probability associated to an event in which a firm j?{3...N} outbids firms 1 and 2 is of second order compared
to the probability of firm 2 beating firm 1 at the auction. An event with a firm j > 2 winning the auction is only likely
to take place when firm 1 has a cost I1 close to Imax, and all firms have costs higher than I1, which is a situation with
extremely low probability.
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Using the fact that µ is uniformly distributed on the support [Qmin/Q1e, Qmax/Q1e], the probability of
contract renegotiation, prob (rP) will be equal to:
)()()1(
)(
)(
2
1
2
1
minmax
minmaxmin
minmax
min
e
P QQZIN
IIQ
QQ
QQ
ZI
ZIrprob
−++
−
−
−
−
+
+
= (14)
where I1 = N/(N+1) Imin + 1/(N+1) I max, and I2 = (N-1)/(N+1) Imin + 2/(N+1) I max are the expected
values for the construction costs of the first and second best firms in the cost ranking of bidders.
A similar condition to (13) is derived for the case of the payment auction, from which the
corresponding probability of contract renegotiation prob (rZ) is calculated:
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An examination of expressions (11) and (14) (and of (12) and (15), respectively), reveals that factors
that affect the probabilities of selection errors and contract renegotiation are very similar. Thus, for
example, the contract term T does not affect the probability of renegotiation for a price auction prob
(rP), while it does for the payment auction. Longer periods increase the probability of renegotiation,
because an optimistic firm relies on obtaining substantial revenues from the concession when
submitting its bid, and this assumption is reinforced by the duration of the contract.
It is not surprising to observe that prob (sP) and prob (rP) are highly correlated because both effects
are linked (the same applies to prob (sZ ) and prob (rZ)). An auction mechanism is more likely to
make selection errors when the winner has a belief for high expected demand, which in turn rises
the probability of contract renegotiation when demand falls below expectations. This is the form that
the “winners’ curse” takes in the context of this model. Even though the probabilities of selection
error and renegotiation generally vary in the same direction, however, the probabilities of
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renegotiation are more affected by demand uncertainty. It can be proved that the range (Qmax – Qmin)
of feasible demand has a larger effect over prob (r{P,Z}) than over prob (s{P,Z}).
Expressions (14) and (15) for the probabilities of renegotiation of contracts can be used to try to
explain the observed fact about prob (rP) being much higher in practice than prob (rZ) (Guasch,
2000). The condition for prob (rP) > prob (rZ) is:
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Condition (16) allows to compare price and payment auctions. The conclusions derived from this
condition are quite revealing. Low prices (i.e., charges to users), short contract terms, and high fee
payments to governments are all factors that make contract renegotiation to be a more likely event
for the minimum price auction than for the maximum payment auction. These three targets appear
frequently in many infrastructure concession programs announced by governments. Therefore, it is
likely that many of the frequently observed concession contracts’ renegotiations could be partly
caused by the type of auction mechanism used for the selection of concessionaires and the values
chosen for P, Z and T.
3.4  Flexible-term concession contracts
Problems suffered by traditional auction mechanisms stem from a basic common feature: uncertainty
about future demand levels introduces uncertainty about total revenue expected by firms. This
induces bids submitted by firms to be ‘contaminated’ by their beliefs on demand, and therefore not
to represent accurately their underlying construction costs. Formally, this can be observed by the
presence of demand expectations (Qie) on expressions (4) and (7), which indicate that firms include
their beliefs in their bids for prices and payments.
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The idea of using concession contracts with flexible terms, proposed for the road sector by Engel
et al (1997) (for a detailed discussion, see Tirole, 1997, 1999), aims at breaking this link between
demand uncertainty and revenue uncertainty. A flexible-term contract works as follows: firms
submit bids for the total revenue that they want to obtain from the concession (Ri). An auction based
on this type of contract awards the concession to the lowest bid R1 < R2 <...<RN. The winner then
is ensured to obtain a revenue equal to R1 by extending the life of the concession as necessary. If
actual demand is Q*, the contract lasts until P Q* T(Q*) = R1, at which point the concession ends.
Before uncertainty about demand is resolved, firms have total expected revenues equal to R = PQeT.
Traditional auctions based on a fixed-term T thus force expected revenues to be a function of the
uncertain demand, R = R(Qe), and bids are computed on the basis of these uncertain revenues.
Meanwhile, if the term T were flexible and endogenously determined by demand, total revenue
could be regarded as constant by each firm. No matter what its belief about demand might be,
submitting a bid for revenue Ri would yield that amount if the firm is selected as concessionaire. If
a firm expects a demand level Qie, and submits a bid Ri, it can expect the concession to last for a
period T(Qie) = Ri/(P Qie). Therefore, its expected revenue would be R = PQieT(Qie) = Ri. This
induces bids that are not affected by beliefs about future demand.
This type of flexible-term concession contracts has already been applied in practice, although the
number of examples around the world is very reduced8. In a context with discount factors δ smaller
than one, firms participating at auctions for flexible-term contracts must submit bids for discounted
revenues, ∑
=
=
e
iT
t
e
i
t
i QPR 1δ . This is the reason why this type of auction has been named as ‘least-
present-value of revenue’ (LPVR), because the concession is awarded to the candidate with the
lowest bid for discounted revenue Ri.
                                                                
8 To our knowledge, the first experience with flexible-term concessions was a UK road project (Dartford bridge). A well
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In the context of our model, with no discount rate, a firm participating at an LPVR auction will
compute its bid according to its type, following some rule R(Ii), with R’(·) > 0. As in the cases of
price and payment auctions, we search for a symmetric equilibrium with all firms using the same
rule R(·) to compute their bids. The probability of winning the auction with an offer Ri has an
expression similar to (1) and (6). The expected contract-term is Tie = Ri/(PQie), so the problem
solved by each firm is now:
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As in previous cases, the first-order condition of this maximisation problem is a differential equation
on R(Ii), which yields the linear solution:
N
IIZIIR imaxii
−
++=)( (18)
Expression (18) reveals the enormous advantages of awarding a flexible-term concession contract
over the traditional fixed-term contracts. First, no demand belief Qie enters expression (18), which
indicates that bids are free from the effect of demand uncertainty. Thus, any possibility of having
selection errors is eliminated. No matter the distribution of beliefs across candidates, this mechanism
will always select the most efficient one in terms of costs, which will be the firm submitting the
offer for lowest revenue. Second, renegotiation never takes place, because the firm receives exactly
the amount requested as total revenue. In the terminology of auction theory, this mechanism allows
the selection of concessionaire to be transformed from a private- and common-value problem, to a
much simpler private-value situation, in which firms only differ according to their construction
costs.
                                                                                                                                                            
documented experience is the concession of a Chilean highway (Santiago-Valparaíso-Viña del Mar), awarded through
an auction based on bids for total discounted revenues (Gómez-Lobo and Hinojosa, 2000).
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Further examination of optimal offers from (18) indicates that expected profits are positive for the
winner. Bids for revenue cover for all costs paid by the firm (Ii + Z), and allow for some extra rent,
which is equal to the information rents that firms expected to extract from the traditional fixed-term
auction systems. This revenue equivalence result can be expressed as:
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Although the three analysed auction mechanisms are ex-ante equivalent for firms, in terms of
expected revenues, they perform very differently ex-post. As it has been already examined, price and
payment auctions have positive probabilities of making selection errors, and it is also likely that the
concession contract could be required to be renegotiated in the event of low demand for the
infrastructure. Meanwhile, the LPVR type of auction yields optimal results. No selection error is
ever made, because firms’ bids are completely free from beliefs about demand. More interestingly,
a flexible-term concession is never renegotiated. In situations of low demand, the only effect is that
the duration of the contract is automatically extended to allow the firm to collect revenues from
charges during a longer period, and thus obtain the requested total amount Ri.
Flexible-term concession contracts, however, suffer at least from four drawbacks. First, because the
firm is ensured to receive its claimed revenue, it has no incentives at all to promote the use of
infrastructure, as pointed out by Tirole (1997). This means that users may end up receiving a poor
service from the infrastructure operator. Second, and related to the former, the concessionaire may
not maintain adequate quality and safety standards, an aspect which should be strictly supervised
by governments. Third, for large projects the amount of required investments is usually high, and
the period needed to recover them will be typically long. Although at the end of the concession the
firm will have obtained its total requested revenue, it might experience some cash-flow shortages
during intermediate periods, which might affect its ability to repay debts. A necessary condition for
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a smooth performance of flexible-term concessions is the existence of well-developed capital
markets, which allow concessionaires to obtain ‘bridge-loans’ for such periods.
There is a fourth limitation of flexible-term contracts, which turns out to be quite serious, and it
arises due to the existence of maintenance and operation costs. In the scenario considered in this
section, in which firms only incur into construction costs, bidders are indifferent to the duration of
the concession. However, when the concessionaire faces annual expenses to operate an
infrastructure, longer periods imply higher costs that might affect its profitability and, in extreme
cases, may even require contract renegotiation.
This latter problem is extensively analysed in the next sections, where a modified LPVR mechanism
is proposed to solve the problems posed by maintenance costs Mi. Before turning to the study of the
case with maintenance and operation costs, some figures are provided to assess the magnitude of
the problems discussed.
3.5  Simulations of price, payment and LPVR auctions
In order to evaluate probabilities of selection errors and renegotiation of concession contracts, some
simulations have been performed. Parameters are chosen to represent a typical case for infrastructure
concessions, in terms of the relative size of variables involved. Using a particular benchmark of
reference, it is possible to assess the impact of each factor by introducing changes in parameters and
studying the impact on outcomes.
The benchmark case corresponds to an auction with N=5 potential candidates. Firms’ construction
costs are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution Ii→U [100; 1,000], and demand beliefs from
an independent distribution Qie→U [10; 30]. The contract-term is set at T=30 years for the fixed-
term auctions. Price is fixed at P=0.75 for the case of maximum payment auction; and payment at
Z=100, for the price auction. With these values, the expected range of total revenue for firms is [225,
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675]. For the average type of firm, with cost Ii = 550, this implies that profits may vary between [-
325, 125], so the project is quite risky and only attractive to firms with low costs.
Table 1 shows the outcomes of each type of auction after performing 5,000 simulations, at each of
which five bidders were randomly chosen regarding both their cost types and beliefs on future
demand levels. Bids from all firms are computed and evaluated to determine the auction’s winner.
The auction’s outcome is then compared with the actual ranking of firms’ costs to calculate the
probability of selection error.
[ INSERT TABLE 1]
For the benchmark case considered, the probabilities of selection errors and contract renegotiation
are considerably high. Figures indicate that price and payment auctions are selecting on average
concessionaires with costs above the optimal level (I1 = (5 Imin+Imax)/6). The basic reason explaining
selection problems is the bias towards optimistic firms. This bias can be assessed by comparing the
average expected demand levels by auction winners with the unbiased expected demand (Qe=20).
Meanwhile, an auction based on the LPVR mechanism yields optimal outcomes: there is no bias in
the selection of concessionaire, which implies optimal selection, and the probability of contract
renegotiation is equal to zero.
In contrast to the situation described in the real world, with a higher probability of renegotiation for
the price auction than for the payment auction, results show similar values for both types in this
case. This is simply due to the size of parameters chosen for the benchmark case: it is possible to
obtain easily situations in which prob (rP) is larger (or lower) than prob (rZ) by changing the values
of P, Z or T.
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4. Scenario with equal maintenance and operation costs
As a first step towards the analysis of the more general case in which firms differ both on
construction and maintenance costs, consider initially a scenario in which we introduce some fixed
annual expenses on maintenance and operation of infrastructure assets, but these costs are known
for all parties and are equal across firms, Mi = M.
For fixed-term auctions, the existence of these costs is irrelevant. It only changes slightly the
functions Pi(Ii) and Z(Ii) used by firms to compute their bids (see expressions (4) and (7)). Firms
simply accommodate for the higher costs and obtain the same expected profits (Imax-Ii)/N. In the case
of the price auction, bids Pi are increased by a factor of M/Qie, which means that each user is
required to pay a share of the annual maintenance costs. Meanwhile, for the payment auction, bids
Zi are reduced by an amount MT, which is equal to total maintenance and operation costs during the
complete life of the concession. In this latter case, the winner is simply subtracting those costs from
the payment proposed to be made to the government, so maintenance costs are in fact transferred
to taxpayers.
The only modification worth to be mentioned for fixed-term auctions, with respect to the analysis
of the previous section, is that the concession term T now has an impact on the probabilities of
selection error and renegotiation for the case of the price auction. In particular, condition (8) for the
selection of a firm Ij other than the best firm I1 is transformed so that parameter T now affects the
condition. The effect of T on probabilities, however, remains being more important for the case of
the payment auction. Another relevant feature is that probabilities of selection errors and
renegotiation for the payment auction are not affected by the size of maintenance cost M, while
probabilities for the price auction do change according to M.
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4.1  Effect of maintenance costs over LPVR auctions
The introduction of maintenance costs M has a dramatic effect on the flexible-term contract. To
realise this, consider the problem that a firm with maintenance cost M participating at an LPVR
auction must solve now. As before, when submitting a bid for revenue Ri, the candidate is
determining its expected term for the contract, which will be equal to Tie = Ri/PQie. Taking into
account the impact of Ri on the probability of winning, firm i calculates its optimal bid by solving:
( ) NrNimaxie
i
ie
i
e
iR IRRIZIQP
R
MQPMax
i
−
−−
−



−−



−=Π 111 )()( (20)
Although in principle this maximisation problem seems to be almost identical to (17), the presence
of M in the expected profits has a strong impact on the solution:
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As it can be observed from expression (21), in the presence of maintenance and operation costs, bids
submitted under LPVR auctions suffer exactly from the same problems detected for the traditional
fixed-term auctions. Beliefs about future demand (Qie) are used when computing bids for revenue
Ri, implying the possibility of distorted information for the selection of concessionaire. Again, it is
possible that an overoptimistic firm may outbid the most efficient firm in terms of costs, inducing
the mechanism to make selection errors. Even more serious is the effect that M has on the
probability of contract renegotiation, which now is different from zero. Although under a flexible
term contract a concessionaire is guaranteed to obtained its claimed Ri revenue, it is no longer
immediate that this amount of revenue will always be sufficiently large to cover for all costs. In the
event of a low demand situation (Q*→Qmin), the contract term must be extended, which causes total
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maintenance costs for the life of the concession to rise. Renegotiation might then be required in
cases where Ii + Z + M T*(Q*) > Ri.
4.2  A new proposed mechanism: least-present-value of net revenue (LPVNR)
The impact of maintenance costs and their associated problems can be avoided by designing a new
type of auction, also based on flexible-term concession contracts. As the aim of the auction
mechanism is to extract information from firms regarding their true construction costs (Ii), the
objective should be to ensure that the bidding variable is as close as possible to Ii. This can be done
by ensuring firms that their annual maintenance cost M will be covered in any case.
The mechanism is similar in nature to LPVR, but yields better results. Firms submit bids Bi for the
total amount of money they demand to cover for investment costs. From revenues collected from
users, each year a part M is considered to be destined to cover for maintenance costs, while the rest
is accounted for as ‘net income perceived’. When total net income perceived is equal to the bid Bi,
the concession ends. Formally expressed, firm i with a bid Bi can therefore expect to hold the
concession until P Qie T = Bi + M T, and the expected term is then equal to Tie = Bi / (P Qie-M). This
new auction mechanism will render exactly the same optimal results in a context with discount rates
δ < 1, therefore it is named as ‘least-present-value of net revenue’ (LPVNR), because the contract
is awarded to the candidate with the lowest bid Bi
Bidders participating at an LPVNR auction will compute their bids Bi according to some function
B(Ii) which is assumed to be shared by all participants. Each firm then solves:
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Solving for Bi shows that this maximisation problem (22) is exactly the same that the firm was
confronted with at an LPVR auction when there are no maintenance and operation costs (see
expression (17)). The solution to (22), therefore, restores the good properties about selection and
no renegotiation that were derived in that case. Optimal bids are equal to:
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Expression (23) indicates why a LPVNR auction outperforms any other auction mechanism in this
context of equal maintenance and operation costs. Submitted bids Bi are completely independent
from beliefs about future demand, and B’(Ii) > 0, therefore the mechanism guarantees the selection
of the most efficient candidate. The auction’s winner extracts some information rent from the
concession, which takes exactly the same expected value as in the other auctions.
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Results from simulations performed for this scenario with constant maintenance costs across firms
are presented in table 2. It can be observed that the LPVR auction mechanism suffers exactly from
the same problems as auctions based on fixed-term concessions, although its probabilities for
selection errors and contract renegotiation are smaller. Meanwhile, the LPVNR auction always
selects the candidate with lowest cost, and it has zero probability of contract renegotiation.
[ INSERT TABLE 2]
5. Scenario with different maintenance and operation costs
The most relevant case for the analysis of auctions for infrastructure concessions is a context in
which firms may differ both on their construction costs (Ii) and also on their maintenance and
operation costs (Mi). The logic behind the assumption of different Mi’s across firms is the same that
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justifies the existence of differences in construction costs. Firms can vary according to their
efficiency levels, for example because managers exert more or less effort in controlling costs.
The existence of different maintenance and operation costs poses some difficulties for the formal
analysis of auctions’ expected outcomes. In particular, firm’s types are no longer uniformly
distributed over some range of construction costs, because the variability of maintenance costs
introduces some changes in the probabilities of each type of firm. A second issue is the definition
of cost efficiency. Total costs expected by each firm are now equal to Ci  = Ii  + Mi T, therefore the
definition of the lowest-cost firm now depends on the contract-term T. For flexible-term concessions
is difficult to determine ex-ante which firm has the lowest cost, due to the fact that actual duration
of the contract (T*) may change according to demand. Some rule is required to calculate probabilities
of selection errors, and to evaluate bids if it is decided to use some form of bi-dimensional auction.
5.1  Probability distribution of firms’ types
Using the assumption of uniform independent distributions for construction costs, Ii→U [Imin; Imax],
and for maintenance costs, Mi→U [Mmin; Mmax], it is possible to derive the probability distribution
of firms’ types. A type now is defined as the value of total costs, Ci  = Ii  + Mi T. As discussed above,
these types may vary according to the contract-term T predefined by the government. For a given
value of T, the distribution function of Ci is equal to:
( ) aiminmini
rr
CCCifCC
TMI
≤≤− ;
2
1 2
F(Ci) = ( ) biaai
r
a CCCifCCI
CF ≤<−+ ;1)( (25)
( )[ ] maxmax22 ;22 1)( CCCifCCCCCTMICF ibbiibrrb ≤<−+−+
27
where Ir = Imax- Imin ;  Ca = Imin+ MmaxT ; Mr = Mmax- Mmin ;  Cb = Imax+ MminT ;   Cmin = Imin+ MminT
; Cmax = Imax+ MmaxT.
Because construction costs are generally much larger than maintenance and operation costs for most
types of infrastructure, it is assumed that Ca < Cb (the other alternative case does not imply any other
significant change than some modifications in the expressions for F(Ci)). Expression (25) shows that
the probability distribution of Ci is not uniform. It exhibits a linear part in the range Ci ? [Ca, Cb],
but the function is convex on [Cmin, Ca], and concave on [Cb, Cmax]. This reflects the fact that
extreme types with very low or very high total costs have small probability masses.
Given this three-part probability distribution, the calculation of optimal bids for the different types
of auctions becomes in general more complex. Strategies must now be a function of full costs Ci,
and therefore the probability of winning with each possible bid of the form f(Ci) has to be calculated
from F(Ci), where f(·) will be the corresponding function P(·), Z(·) or R(·), for each type of auction.
5.2  Impact of maintenance and operation costs Mi on fixed-term concessions
The maximisation problems for computing optimal bids to participate at a minimum price or
maximum payment auction are not basically altered from those cases analysed in previous sections.
The only difference is the change in the definition of firms’ types. In this scenario, firms’ bids are
functions of real full costs Ci = Ii +Mi T.
The probability of a firm i winning an auction with a bid Pi=P(Ci), or Zi=Z(Ci), now varies according
to the range where the bid falls. In general, for any bid Pi or Zi there will be three possible cases,
according to the possibilities of having either P-1(Pi) < Ca; Ca ? P-1(Pi) ? Cb; or Cb < P-1(Pi). The two
extreme cases yield non-linear solutions, while the intermediate case is linear, due to the fact that
types Ci are uniformly distributed between Ca and Cb. (A complete derivation of the optimal
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strategy, taking into account the whole distribution of Ci , for the case of a price auction is presented
in detail in the appendix)
For infrastructure projects with large construction costs, the extreme cases can be disregarded,
because when Mi is small relative to Ii, Ca→Cmin and Cb→Cmax. Considering that all bids submitted
by candidates lie within the range [Ca, Cb], optimal bids for price auctions and payment auctions will
have linear forms, similar to (4) and (7), respectively.
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A simple examination of expressions (26) and (27) indicates that these solutions share the same
features of those analysed on previous sections. Both P(Ci) and Z(Ci) and functions that depend on
beliefs Qie , therefore outcomes will again be plagued from the same problems of selection errors
and possible contract renegotiation discussed above.
5.3  Impact of maintenance and operation costs Mi on LPVR and LPVNR concessions
As it is the case for fixed-term concessions, optimal bidding strategies to follow at an LPVR auction
are not fundamentally altered. The only major change is that bids for revenue Ri are calculated as
a function of total costs Ci. Assuming that all bids lie within the range [Ca, Cb], yields the solution:
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A comparison of expressions (28) and (21) shows that results obtained for the case with equal
maintenance costs Mi=M are not altered for LPVR auctions when variability on Mi is introduced.
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The bid for revenue Ri is slightly more complex, to take into account the true value of maintenance
and operation costs for each firm i, but its main features remain unaltered, included the effect of
beliefs on future demand on bids Ri.
For the LPVNR auction, the existence of different values for Mi across firms introduces changes.
Because the government now does not have accurate information about the size of these costs, a first
alternative could be to use the expected average value Mav = (Mmin+Mmax)/2, to determine the part
of revenues collected from charges that will be assigned each year to cover for maintenance costs.
Firms are again invited to submit bids on the revenue, net of maintenance and operation costs, taht
they demand to recover their investment costs, and the contract is awarded to the lowest bid.
Thereafter, when the actual level of demand Q* is known, the duration of the contract wil be equal
to T* = Bi /(P Q* - Mav)
Considering that firms will compute their bids Bi based on their real full costs9, Bi=B(Ci), the
problem that they solve is:
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Optimal strategies are then:
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Expression (30) shows how, in the presence of different maintenance costs across firms, the
mechanism LPVNR does not have the property of eliminating completely the presence of demand
                                                                
9 Another possible alternative could be to consider that firms only take into account construction costs to calculate bids,
i.e. Bi = B(Ii). In that case, it is found that the optimal strategy is Bi = (PQie-Mav) [Ii+Z+(Imax-Ii)/N] / (PQie-Mav), which
is similar to (30) and yields on average the same profits.
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beliefs in bids Bi. Therefore, it is possible that this auction mechanism could also make selection
errors. A careful examination of expressions (28) and (30) indicates that, although they appear to
be similar, the effect of Qie on Ri and Bi is different. This effect can be checked by taking the
corresponding derivatives:
0)(
2
1
)( 2
<

 


−−−++
−
−
=
∂
∂
ai
r
ri
i
e
i
i
e
i
i CCTMI
N
ZI
MQP
MP
Q
R
(31)
0)(
2
1
)(
)(
2 >
<


 


−−−++
−
−
=
∂
∂
ai
r
ri
i
e
i
iav
e
i
i CCTMI
N
ZI
MQP
MMP
Q
B
(32)
The negative sign of derivative ?Ri/?Qie indicates the bias towards selecting optimistic candidates
for the LPVR auction. High expected values Qie result in lower bids, thus increasing the probability
of selection errors. This is the same effect that had been already detected in the case of equal
maintenance costs.
Meanwhile, distortions introduced by demand beliefs Qie on bids for net revenues at a LPVNR
auction are smaller (observe that eii
e
ii QBQR ∂∂>∂∂ // ). Moreover, the effect of Qie on the
bid may vary according to the type of firms. For those candidates with maintenance costs Mi > Mav
the sign of ?Bi/?Qie is negative, and the effect is the same as observed for ?Ri/?Qie. But, for
candidates with costs Mi smaller than Mav, the effect is exactly the opposite. In this latter case, more
optimistic firms tend to rise their bids, thus decreasing the probability of winning the auction. The
combination of both these effects is likely to result in better selection outcomes for LPVNR auctions
than for the other mechanisms.
A comparison of all outcomes derived in the context of this scenario with different Mi costs for the
four auctions examined again provides a revenue equivalence result: ex-ante profits expected by the
winner of any of the auctions are again equal. The existence of differences across firms allow those
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firms with lower maintenance costs to obtain higher profits than those obtained in the case of
constant costs, Mi=M (compare the result with expression (24) above).
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However, this expected revenue-equivalence does not imply that the ex-post performance of all
types of mechanisms is the same. This can be proved by numerical simulations for this scenario,
which reveal that flexible-term concessions perform generally better than the traditional
mechanisms. Table 3 presents the results obtained from these simulations, based again on the
benchmark case, and assuming that Mi → U[3,7].
[INSERT TABLE 3]
As expected, the LPVNR auction now presents positive probabilities of selection errors and
renegotiation. However, it is interesting to observe how this mechanism yields better results than
the alternative LPVR, and also outperforms the traditional auctions based on fixed-term contracts.
5.4  LPVNR auction based on bids with two dimensions
This final section aims to complete the analysis of feasible auctions to award concession contracts
for infrastructure projects by analysing a possible refinement of the LPVNR auction. This new
proposed mechanism has been proved to yield optimal outcomes in simple scenarios with constant
maintenance costs, clearly outperforming both traditional auction models and the LPVR type of
auction (which does not take into account explicitly the existence of maintenance costs in the
auction design). However, in a real context of strong asymmetries of information, it is possible that
a government could be completely uninformed about the size of maintenance costs Mi, so it will be
unable to use an LPVNR auction as described in the previous section (which implies the use of some
known average maintenance cost Mav). The refinement proposed is then to invite firms to submit
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bids with two dimensions: (a) total revenues to be obtained from the concession, net of maintenance
costs (Bi); and (b) annual average expenses on maintenance and operation costs (Ei).
The analysis of this proposed variation of LPVNR is interesting both from a practical point of view
(because it could be an alternative for governments to auction concession projects), and also from
a theoretical perspective. There are not many examples in the auction literature dealing with
situations in which bidders submit bids in more than one dimension (Che, 1993; Branco, 1997).
However, as pointed out by McAfee and McMillan (1987), it is frequent that when awarding
contracts, governments are interested in more than on dimension of information (e.g. quality, prices,
investment levels, and so forth). It is then interesting to try to compute equilibrium strategies when
firms are requested to submit this type of bi-dimensional bids.
The first step is to calculate the probability for a firm i to win the auction with a bid (Bi ,Ei). In order
to do that, we need first to establish how the government will evaluate offers. Due to the fact that,
for a flexible-term concession, the contract term is ex-ante undetermined, there is not a unique
option to evaluate which offer is the best in terms of total expected costs. One alternative is to set
some arbitrary period of reference Tev, and calculate expected total costs as Cie = Bi + Ei Tev,
awarding the contract to the lowest offer. Other options are to announce a range of periods [Tmin,
Tmax], and compute average expected costs over that range, or to choose the firm with lowest costs
during more periods within that range. It can be proved that when firms know the range of periods
used for evaluation, all these criteria are equivalent to use the intermediate point of the range as a
period of reference, i.e. Tev = (Tmin+Tmax)/2. Therefore, for a simpler exposition, we will work with
a single period Tev for the evaluation of bids.
It is no longer feasible in this context to use general strategies of the form Bi = B(Ci), Ei = E(Ci),
because evaluation of bids would then imply the use of a joint-inverse function [B(Ci)+ E(Ci) Tev]-1,
from which it is impossible to retrieve individual functions for B(·), E(·). Instead, a simpler way to
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calculate probabilities of winning the auction is to assume some particular forms for the functions
B(·) and E(·) that can be related to some random variable with known probability distribution.
Natural candidates are linear forms for Bi and Ei, in terms of construction and maintenance costs,
respectively. It is then assumed that firms choose their bids for net revenue as a function of
construction costs, Bi = α + β Ii, and bids for reimbursement of maintenance costs as a function of
their true costs, Ei = γ Mi.10
Using these rules, the probability of firm i winning the auction is equal to the probability of the
event Bi + Ei Tev < Bj + Ej Tev, for any possible j, which can be expressed as:
[ ]( ) 1−++<+= Nevjjeviii TMITEBprobprob γβα (34)
The probability distribution of α + β Ij + γ Mj Tev can be calculated from the uniform distributions
of Ij and Mj (it has a form very similar to that of Ci, see expression (25)). Therefore, it is possible
to derive an explicit expression for probi, which can be used to maximise expected profits.
Assuming, as in previous sections, that only the linear part of the probability distribution is relevant
(which is equivalent to say that all bids C’i = Bi + Ei Tev fall within a given range), the probability
of firm i winning the auction with a bid Ci’ is equal to:
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where Ca’ = α + β Imin+ γ Mmax Tev .
                                                                
10 Another possible option is to make both Bi and Ei dependent on full cost Ci.(e.g. Bi = α+βCi,  Ei = α’+β’Ci). However,
this is equivalent to the forms adopted, implying only a reinterpretation of coefficients α, β and γ. The same argument
applies to the choice of introducing a constant term α only in the function of Bi and not on Ei.
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Considering that the concession will last for an expected term Tie = Bi/(PQie-Ei), discarding some
constants terms, and denoting by θ = α + β Imax+ γ Tev (Mmin+Mmax)/2, the problem that firm i solves
to determine its optimal bid (Bi, Ei) can be expressed as:
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The two first-order conditions of this problem constitute a non-linear system of equations in terms
of Bi and Ei:
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There exist two solutions, (Bi’, Ei’) and (Bi’’, Ei’’), for this system of equations, and for each of them
it is possible to obtain explicit expressions for parameters α, β and γ, using the assumed forms for
the optimal strategies. Both of them have some economic interpretation. The first solution (Bi’, Ei’)
is a bid that yields expected profits equal to zero, so any firm i will only submit this bid in absence
of any other better option.
The second solution (Bi’’, Ei’’) yields an expected profit equal to Πie’’ = P Qie Tev – (Ii+Mi Tev + Z),
i.e., the firm tries to extract from the concession all the existent surplus expected from the project,
computed on the basis of a contract-term equal to the evaluation period Tev. This second solution
is in fact a whole family of feasible bids, with Ei’’ = E(Ii, Mi, Qie), and Bi’’ = Tev (P Qie – Ei’’), all
of which yield the same expected level of profit (Πie’’). Firms that have negative expected values
for this profit level –a case that might occur for high-cost firms with low expected demands– will
opt for the other alternative bid (Bi’, Ei’), or will drop out from the auction.
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Optimal strategies for firms derived for the context of this bi-dimensional auction can be easily
interpreted. Due to the fact that bids (Bi, Ei) must be eventually reduced to a single-dimension score
for evaluation purposes, candidates know that they can try to extract rents from the concession,
either by rising bids Bi over real construction costs (Ii), or rising the other dimension Ei over real
maintenance costs (Mi). Tailoring the strategy in such a way that the total bid Ci’ = Bi + Ei Tev is kept
constant does not affect the probability of winning, but the effects of moving Bi or Ei can be very
different on the expected profit levels. When a firm considers that the concession will last for a
longer period than the one used for evaluation, it will be interested in increasing the gap Ei-Mi,
because each additional year as operator of the infrastructure provides that difference as extra
profits. On the contrary, if a candidate expects the concession to be short, it will be more rewarding
to try to extract rents from the difference between real and declared construction costs, (Bi-Ii).
The main conclusion for this proposed refinement of the LPVNR mechanism is that beliefs Qie still
enter the calculation of optimal strategies. Therefore, once again it is concluded that the mechanism
is susceptible to make selection errors, as it is the case with the other auction systems studied in this
paper. Nevertheless, empirical simulations (performed within the framework of the benchmark case
analysed above) indicate that this variant of LPVNR yields reasonable good outcomes. This makes
it a good candidate to be used in practice by governments that want to implement auctions based on
the idea of flexible-term contracts, but are completely uninformed about the possible range of values
for maintenance and operation costs of an infrastructure.
[ INSERT TABLE 4]
One interesting finding from the empirical analysis is that this type of auction seems to favour low
cost-firms, as revealed from the average size Ii of winners, which is much lower than for other
auctions. This results in higher expected profits for concessionaires (as a result of larger
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informational rents), but it has a good impact on the probability of renegotiation, which is very low
compared to that of other auction systems. Meanwhile, the probability of selection errors is
relatively high for this case (18.9%), but nevertheless this is far better than those found for the
traditional auction mechanisms, and also for the LPVR type of auction (see table 3). The relatively
high probability of selection errors of LPVNR auctions with bi-dimensional bids is originated by
a bias towards optimistic firms, as it can be observed from the average expected demand levels of
winners (24.8 against an unbiased average of 20). This effect is shared with all the other auction
systems analysed, with the exception of the LPVNR auction based on the use of average
maintenance and operation costs.
The bi-dimensional auction proposed also has some other features that can make it very attractive
for practical purposes. A frequent event during the life of infrastructure concessions is that
governments may at some point want to modify an on-going project (e.g. power generation capacity
enlargements, modifications of road layouts, and the like). Renegotiation is then required in those
cases, not due to financial problems of the concessionaire, but because the new framework may
require additional investments or significant changes in financial arrangements. These renegotiatons
are usually complex, because firms exploit their advantages of information, and may try to extract
additional profits from the concession. Transaction costs can also be an element of importance in
this process.
If a contract is awarded through a LPVNR auction, based on bi-dimensional bids, renegotiation
problems are completely eliminated. This is achieved because the concessionaire reveals at the
auction all the required information to the government. In case that a government decides to modify
an infrastructure project, or if there is a conflict between parties that makes it recommendable to
terminate the contract, the concessionaire can be automatically compensated for its costs and the
contract ended.
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The bid for net revenue Bi can be easily used to calculate the amount of money by which a firm
needs to be compensated for the income that it ceases to receive if forced to abandon a concession
(a matter which in many occasions must be decided by courts when renegotiated concessions are of
fixed-term nature). On the other hand, the bid for annual maintenance costs Ei demanded by the own
concessionaire is a tremendously useful value of reference to estimate actual expenses for that
concept. In real renegotiation situations, when a firm bargains with a government about
compensation payments, it benefits from the asymmetry of information regarding those costs.
Renegotiation of LPVNR contracts has no difficulties at all on the point of maintenance and
operation costs: the company can be compensated exactly by the amount that it claimed in its bid,
allowing governments to reject any other demands.
6. Conclusions
Results obtained in this paper make a good case for the revision of traditional models used to select
concessionaires for infrastructure projects. Auctions based on bids for minimum prices or maximum
payments exhibit a poor performance in terms of selecting the best candidate among a group of
bidders. It has been shown that, by design, this type of auctions introduce a bias towards selecting
firms that are optimistic about expected demand, but are not necessarily the most efficient in terms
of costs. Infrastructure projects are then likely to be implemented at costs higher than optimal, which
results in a social misuse of resources. In situations of weak demand, high-cost concessionaires are
more likely to experience financial difficulties and claim for contract renegotiation. This is a form
of “winner’s curse” in the context of concession contracts. Mechanisms used to select firms may be
in part responsible for the high rate of renegotiation of concessions observed in practice.
The use of flexible-term contracts could greatly improve firms’ selection. Contracts with flexible
duration eliminate the need to use demand forecasts to compute bids, and the bias suffered by
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traditional mechanisms. It has been shown that a form of revenue-equivalence theorem applies in
this context. All mechanisms to award concession contracts allow auction winners to extract exactly
the same informational rents, regardless of the system employed. Therefore, flexible-term
concessions improve the selection of concessionaires at zero cost: information rents extracted by
winners are the same as those obtained under price or payment auctions. On the other hand, the
reduction of risks associated to demand fluctuations allows concessionaires to obtain resources from
capital markets at lower costs, because risk premia on borrowing rates will tend to be smaller.
In situations in which a government is completely uninformed about maintenance and operation
costs, a new type of auction mechanism is proposed. Firms are invited to submit bi-dimensional bids
on the following variables: (a) total revenues, net from maintenance and operation costs, to obtain
from the concession; and (b) average annual amount of maintenance and operation expenses.
Although this new mechanism is not completely error-free, outcomes from simulations are
reasonably good in terms of selection of concessionaires and low probability of renegotiation.
The analysis of auctions for concession contracts must be extended in several directions. First, we
have not considered the possibility of risk aversion. Bidders’ attitudes with respect to risk are known
to have effects on auctions’ outcomes, (Holt, 1980; Maskin and Riley, 1984), so it would be
interesting to examine what is the impact of considering different types of bidders. Asymmetries
among bidders regarding costs and information is also another area which is of great importance for
infrastructure projects. The issue of collusion should also be studied, as pointed out by Laffont
(1997), because usually the number of firms participating in auctions for concessions is reduced, and
the same agents participate repeatedly at auctions for projects. A final open question is the possible
existence of a mechanism, simple enough to be used in practice, and that could be able to completely
isolate firms’ bids from their expectations about future demand levels.
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Appendix
Derivation of bidding rule P(Ii) for a minimum price auction considering the full range of
feasible values for cost Ci
Consider that each bidder uses the same function P(Ci) to calculate its optimal bid Pi, where Ci
=Ii+Mi T is the real full cost of the firm. The probability of firm i winning the auction against N-1
rivals (probi ) is then equal to (prob [Pi < Pj] )N-1, which, applying the inverse function P-1(·), can
be expressed as (prob [P-1 (Pi) < Cj] )N-1. Using the cumulative distribution function defined in (27),
probi (P-1 [Pi]) takes the form:
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where  Ir = Imax- Imin ; Mr = Mmax- Mmin;  Ca = Imin+ MmaxT;  Cb = Imax+ MminT;  Cmin = Imin+ MminT;
 Cmax = Imax+ MmaxT. If firm i is participating at a price auction, in order to choose its optimal
bidding rule P(Ci), it solves:
( ) [ ]( ))()( 1)( iiiiieiiieiCP CPPprobZTMITQCPMax ii −−−−=Π (A.2)
Solution to problem (A.2) has three different parts, according to the size of firm i’s full cost Ci
compared to the reference values Ca and Cb. These three parts stem from solving three separate
differential equations obtained from the first-order condition of the maximisation problem (A.2):
(a) If Cmin ? Ci ? Ca, the foc in this case is:
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yielding the solution:
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(b) If Ca < Ci ? Cb, the foc takes the form:
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Solution for P(Ci): see expression (28) in the text.
(c) If Cb < Ci ? Cmax, the foc is:
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and its corresponding solution:
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Table 1.  Average outcomes from auctions (Case with no maintenance costs)
Winner’s real
construction
cost
Winner’s
expected
profits
Winner’s
expected
demand
Probability of
selection error
Probability of
contract
renegotiation
Price auction 314.9 137.0 24.2 41.2% 38.5%
Payment auction 291.6 141.7 23.5 35.5% 37.9%
LPVR auction 248.3 150.3 19.9 0 0
Optimal expected values 250 0 20 0 0
Table 2: Average outcomes from auctions. Case with equal maintenance costs (M=5)
Winner’s real
construction
cost
Winner’s
expected
profits
Winner’s
expected
demand
Probability of
selection error
Probability of
contract
renegotiation
Price auction 342.5 131.5 24.8 47.9% 49.9%
Payment auction 295.3 140.9 23.6 36.4% 38.3%
LPVR auction 282.5 143.5 22.9 28.9% 18.3%
LPVNR auction 251.5 149.7 20.0 0 0
Optimal expected values 250 0 20 0 0
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Table 3: Average outcomes from auctions.
Case with different maintenance costs; Mi→U[3,7]
Winner’s real
construction
cost
Winner’s
expected
profits
Winner’s
expected
demand
Probability of
selection error
Probability of
contract
renegotiation
Price auction 343.0 132.1 24.8 47.5% 49.5%
Payment auction 298.4 141.2 23.6 36.6% 38.5%
LPVR auction 289.4 144.2 22.7 27.5% 16.2%
LPVNR auction (using Mav) 281.7 143.6 19.7 18.8% 0.04%
Optimal expected values 250 0 20 0 0
Table 4: Average outcomes from an LPVNR auction with bi-dimensional bids
Winner’s real
construction
cost
Winner’s
expected
profits
Winner’s
expected
demand
Probability of
selection error
Probability of
contract
renegotiation
LPVNR auction (Bi, Ei) 200.4 238.4 24.8 18.9% 0.02%
Optimal expected values 250 0 20 0 0
